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THE INTERNATIONAL SPREAD OF
BUSINESS CYCLES
Section 1. The Problem
As long as economists have studied economic fluctuations they have
recognized that the disturbances of economic life often have a
tendency to spread from one country to another. Businessmen have
been aware of this tendency and have had reason sometimes to
welcome the impulses received from prosperity elsewhere, some-
times to complain about the bad effects of distress abroad. Poli-
ticians and statesmen have variously tried to intervene in these
processes by opening up new foreign markets, obtaining orlending
capital abroad, or shielding the economy behind tariff walls and
even more restrictive measures. Indeed mostsuch measures date
back far into the niercantilistic period and not only preceded
systematic economic thought but also helped to initiate it.
Currently the world is very conscious of the problem of business
cycle transmission. This expresses itself in the establishment of the
International Monetary Fund and the International Bank, modeled
after other institutions such as the Bank for International Settle-
ments and looser arrangements for financial cooperation. Discus-
sion of them lies outside the scope of this work, which is chiefly
concerned with the periods from 1870 to 1914 and 1925 to 1938.
Aside from these institutional arrangements there is often a strong
conviction that now even more than in the years since World War I
the fluctuations of the American economy are chiefly responsible
for international disturbances, that the great weight of American
foreign transactions determines the course of the world economy.
At the same time there is a tendency, so it is argued, for the Ameri
can economy to pay far greater attention to itsdomestic affairs
because these outweigh American foreign transactions by a factor
of more than ten to one. This argument, found not only in popular
and political accounts, though oversimplified, nevertheless points
to a real difficulty.
Another source of discussion lies in the fact that now there are
simultaneously several economic systems distinguished by the ex-
tent to which they are centrally directed. The adherents ofplanned
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economies accuse the free economies of being unstable and up-
setting the former (although they are planned!) and every move-
ment in the direction of one or the other type of economy is viewed
with alarm by some country. There is a growing conviction of the
need for international cooperation in schemes to attain "stability."
There is, however, a lamentable lack of scientific studies upon
which practical measures could be built, The present specialized
work, while not concerned directly with problems of future policy,
may contribute to policy making through its examination of past
policies and the free interaction of financial spheres of several
countries.
The study of national cycles has progressed chiefly because
abstract, general speculations, based on scanty material or even
without any definite empirical background, have been re-examined
and gradually replaced by more cautious, limited hypotheses de-
rived from factual investigations and better data. Gradually statisti-
cal methods have been evolved to satisfy the special needs arising
from these studies. Knàwledge about the behavior of business
cycles differs considerably from country to country and is formost
of them better for the more recent fluctuations, because informa-
tion is fuller. However, during these later periodsmany important
external disturbances occurred, beginning with World War I,so
that the interpretation of this better statistical materialis difficult.
In this chapter we shall discuss the problem of theinternational
transmission of business cycles in its broadest aspects, in order
to set up a general conceptual and methodological frameof
reference. It will be neither completenor in all respects quite
definite. We are enteringupon a study for which there are un-
fortunately few examples, either in thetheoretical or in the
empirical domain. Thus we shall haveto be guided by the experi-
ence gained in the analysis of domestic economic fluctuationsand
try to obtain as much helpas possible from related sections of
economic theory, chiefly the theory ofinternational trade.
It .is not surprising that the fewexplanations of the international
transmission of cycles offered currentlyare very tentative and
appear more or less as mere appendixes to,or extensions of, partic-
ular cycle theories. Often theymake use of some theoremsrelating
to international trade, although thepresent essentially static theory
of international trade deals withdynamic phenomena onlyin a
very rudimentary manner. Consequentlya survey of these explana-
tions reveals their stronglyhypothetical and frequentlycontra-
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dictory character. It is easy to see that the contradictions derive
quite naturally from the fact that the theories to which the
statements about the international aspects of business cycles are
appended are themselves often mutually exclusive or, at best, place
a widely different emphasis upon some of the different characteris-
tics of the cycles. Furthermore the uncertain factual background
of these theories accounts for some of their contradictions.
Similarly there is a great dearth of factual, empirico-statistical
investigations relating to international cycles and their transmission.
But these have only recently been begun even in the domestic
field; the methods for the treatment and analysis of the statistics
are in flux; the checking of theories is still only an incidental matter.
Thus it is too early to expect international economic analyses of
prices, production, money, etc. of a caliber equal to those that
exist for some domestic economies. There is even a great dea.ih of
accounts of a historical nature, as distinguished from techrco-
statistical investigations. What exists in that respect is mostv
scattered in innumerable periodicals, newspapers, and occasionai
writings by current observers.
The present book cannot fill these many gaps, i.e., to giv' a his-
torical account, to present and analyze (with approprately new
methods) a wealth of new, specially collected statistics, and to
abstract a theory of the international transmission of economic
fluctuations. This would indeed be a superhuman task. Many re-
search workers in many countries, employing freely their own tested
methods, will be necessary to further our understanding of these
complicated matters. In the meantime we shall choose interna-
tional financial transactions as a restricted field of high coherence
and great significance. We can at least canvass the field and make
stabs in several directions, knowing very well that completeness is
out of the question.
Anticipating more detailed discussion (cf. section 3) there is one
point where it may seem a priori that we are going too far: we wish
to describein a financial field still to be delimitedthe spread of
fluctuations (possibly cycles), i.e., an interaction among economies,
rather than a mere parallelism in their behavior, which may or may
not be distorted by leads or lags or other differences. it is true that
thereby we set our aims higher than might at first seem necessary.
But by trying to obtain some idea of interaction we can make use
of notions about a mechanism of transmission of fluctuations that
has been thought over by a long line of economists ever since
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Cantillon. Although this is more complicated than a mere descrip-
lion of simultaneous behavior, it is more satisfactory on general
scientific grounds. That is to sayand we shall return to this
thought repeatedlya problem must not be simplified too much
lest it lose all meaning and access to its very heart remain blocked
indefinitely.
It is imperative to comprehend from the outset how involved a
problem is, so that the necessary siinpliflcations may be made in
the light of that knowledge, in the proper direction, and may not
be carried too far. Or putting it differently: a certain degree of corn-
plexity is necessary even for the simplest and most modest begin-
ning. Whether the limits set for the present undertaking were right,
or too narrow, or too wide is something that in the absence of more
definite, guiding theories can be judged only when we have fin-
ished.1 And even then there may be differences of opinion.
We deal in our statistico-historical, and to a modest extent theo-
retical, analysis with financialoperationsortransactions.Even thi5
is a wide field and it cannot be sharply separated from others. The
transactions consist in the shifts of short-term and long-term funds
as a consequence of international trade, in response to interest
rates, to attractions of stock markets in various parts of the world,
loans in foreign countries for their development, central bank
operations in the gold markets, etc. This indicates that relative
movements of interest rates, stock market prices, balances of trade,
balances of payments, flotations of foreign loans, goldmovements,
etc., would all have to be investigated, first for parallelism intheir
behavior and second for disclosure ofa transmission of disturbances
and cycles.
The limitation of the study does notmean that we believe that
other factors do not actupon the financial transactions or vice versa
or that a compartmentalization is desirable. It is merelyamatter of
expediency.In particular we desire to getaway from wide, over-all
statements involving equally global, inclusive figureswhich at best
allow some rough correlations thatcan be interpreted in dozens of
ways. The thinking in unanalyzed globalaggregates has become a
characteristic of contemporaiyeconomies which in that respect has
lapsed back to the so-called classicalschool. Our thought andpro-
1We refer to this important principlerepeatedly throughout the whole book Ed. in particular nage 30]. Thisprinciple is of high signilicance inscience; it is directly applicalle to economic theoryat any level of abstraction.
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cedure are diametrically opposed to this tendency, as the sequel will
show.2
The degree of detail is largely imposed upon us by the assertions
made in theories that will guide our statistical investigations. In
other words when the existence of very definite, fine interrelations
is asserted and we wish to examine them statistically, wehave no
other choice than to use data that are at least as detailed as the
theories involved. Only in this way can it be discovered whetherthe
guiding theoretical principles are reasonable and the limitations of
greater generalizations are shown.
One might ask whether it is sound to start with these theories at
all. Is it not like voluntarily puffing on a strait jacket, then trying
hard to get out of it and claiming success if this succeeds while one
is really only where he started? This view would beimpractical and
unjust. The various theories may have many faults, butthey were
thought out carefully, over many generations, with reference to
manifold experiences. It would be unwise to brush this accumulated
store of belief and knowledge aside, because there is noother guide
for the first steps into the maze of concrete material. Wewould
probably fumble unnecessarily if we dispensed with them fromthe
outset. Of course once we have some orientation inthe new tern-
tory we may proceed on our own withconfidence.
Section 2. Statistical Methods and Materials
The level of our investigation must be decided onfrom the out-
set. For example, it is possible to limitourselves to pure description
by studying the background of each series, visuallyinspecting and
interpreting charts, and drawing economicconclusions from both
background and charts. Or the series might besubjected to the
most formidable modern statisticalmethods so that the economic
interpretation reduces to an arrangement in equationsof numerical
results giving number, amplitudes of cycles, theirenergies, their
This does not exclude the desirability of a descriptionof the behavior of
global aggregates. Their phenomenology needs to becarefully explored; but
a satisfactory theory involvingthese aggregates can be constructed only if their
compositions and changes In these latter arethoroughly understood. Often this
is not the case even in regard to the simplestand apparently perfectly well
established concepts such as aggregate demand andsupply. Cf. 0. Morgenstem,
'Demand Theory Reconsidered," Quarteriy Journal ofEconoidcs, Vol. Lxii,
February 1948, pp. 165-201.
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interconnection, autocorrelations, their hidden cycles, etc., leaving
correspondingly less to intuitive evaluation.
Neither is entirely satisfactory at present. The first is not, because
in the study of national cycles we have passed slightly beyond this
stage; the second is not, because it should not be undertaken before
the factual, institutional background is well understood, as is not
the case. We shall endeavor to remain as closely as possible at the
strictly phenomenological level. This refers then both to the inten-
tion to keep theoretical interpretation to a minimum and to engage
only in very simple statistical operations.
The great progress of statistics over the last twenty-five years nat-
urally produces the desire to apply the new methods and concepts
over wide fields. Yet there has been no change in the fundamental
relations that must exist between accuracy of observation and under-
standing of its background on the one hand, and fineness of statis-
tical operations on the other. We need not even ask what these new
techniques are, before the first condition is satisfied. And it is pre-
cisely the task of this work to explore some of this background. Even
more basically, the elementary statistics hardly exist at all, so that
the task reduces to the still more primitive one of collecting, sift-
ing, and presenting the data. This takes up the best part of our
effort. Only when all this is finished can the question be raised
whether more advanced statistical procedures (Fourier analysis,
spectral analysis, etc.) should not be used in further work.3
The basic ideas of cycle analysis developed by A. F. Burns and
W. C. Mitchell4 will be used to some extent in this work. We shall
in particular make free use of the notions of specific cycles and
reference cycles; when they are applied toour time series they are
used according to the procedure of these two authors.We shall also
make some simple measurements of the durations of cycles,etc. and
apply these iii a natural extension of the basic ideasto international
comparisons. On the other hand there arise situations in the last
connection where a still simpler approach is indicated. Thereare
also series where an application doesnot seem possible either be-
cause they are of a disturbing type foreseen in Burns-Mitchellor
because the series are too arbitrary in thesense of the identification
* Formore, cf. my paper "Experiment and Large Scale Computation inEco- nomics,in Economic Actiult!, Analysis, 0. Morgenstem, editorWiley 1954.
4Arthar F. Burns and Wesley C. Mitchell, MeasuringBusiness Cycles, Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research, 1948.
Cf. ibid., Chapter vil, section 3.STATISTiCAL METHODS AND MATERIALS
of peaks and troughs or because acycle cannot be interpreted even
when found.° Since this entire study is in afar more preliminary
stage than someof those dealing with domestic cycles,the more
complex measurements of the NationalBureau method are not sys-
tematically incorporated in the bodyof the text.
The Burns-Mitchell procedure maybe included among the sim-
ple (elementary) methods referred toabove. The division into
elementary and nonelementaryprocedures is of course highly arbi-
trary. But since theBums-Mitchell method contains basicallyquali-
tative elements upon whichthe quantitative measures rest, its in-
clusion in the former group isnatural!
Since in this work a large amountof economic statistics is gath-
ered and analyzed by various simpletechniques, it may seemuseful
to make these generalcomments:
Economic statistics arein theoverwhelming majority of
casesnot scientificobservations.This is a point of primary signifi-
cance. They are atbest historical accounts; mostlythey are by-
products of business operations orof administrative acts. They are,
as a rule, badlycollected by scientifically untrained minorofficials
at the customhouscs,warehouses, on street markets, etc. Inother
words they are not the results ofcarefully set experiments or of
strictly controlled measurements as areastronomical observations.
Examples of the extraordinarycrudeness of data will be given
later (especially in section 4of Chapter V).
The stocha$tic character of mosteconomic statistics is thus
perhaps more obvious than thatof other statistics and it is even
more obvious with many weshall be forced to use. Deductionsal)-
stracted from them can hardly be veryaccurate, sharp, and definite.9
'Cf. ibid., p. 57. Cf. also M. G.Kendall, Contributions to the Study of
Oscillatonj Time-Series, National Instituteof Economic and Social Research,
Occasional Paper ix, 1948, and the reviews by T.W. Anderson and 0. Morgen-
stern, journalofthe American Statistical AssociatiOn,Vol. 42, March 1947,
pp. 187ff.
The (definitely non-elementary)methods for finding cycles referred to in
note 3 above are free from suchqualitative factors.
'For a more detailed examination,cf. 0. Morgenstern, On the Accuracyof
Economic Obsewations, PrincetonUniversity Press, 1950, 2nd ed., 1959.
For a discussion of these matterscf. especially T. llaavelmo, "TheProba-
bility Approach in Econometrics,"Econornetrica, Vol. 12, Supplement,1944,
and various papers by T. Koopmans,especially, "The Logic of Econometric
Business-Cycle Research," journalofPolitical Economy, Vol. 49, 1941,and
"Statistical Estimation of SimultaneousEconomic Relations," journalofthe
American StatisticalAssociation,Vol.40,1945. Cf.also the review of
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When activities are only imperfectly reported, it is withoutmean-
ing to show figures giving great detail, into many decimals, or when
estimates are involved that can be wide of the mark (quite aside
from the expense that each additional digit represents). Detail,
however, is needed when the relations are of fine structure;a good
example is offered by Table 85 showing New York goldpoints
where eveiy abbreviation would have been a loss and wheregood
reasons exist to assume a degree of accuracyofinformation in the
operationscorresponding to the needs of the analyticalstatements
involved. But it would of course be absurd to reportturnovers of
foreign exchange transactions in units smaller thanhundreth of
millions of dollars, etc.
(3) To the "fuzziness" of our data is addeda similar fuzziness in
some theories. This is true only of some, because othersgo uncom-
monly far for economics in making precisestatements. An outstand-
ing example of unusual precision that willoccupy us much is the
assertion that under a gold standard regimeexchange rates cannot
go beyond (sharply defined) gold points. Sucha statement can be
tested if gold points and exchangerates may be independently
observed, even if each observation hasits own probabilistic quality.
But there are themore inclusive theories of thetransmission of
economic fluctuations operating with hugeaggregates and very in-
clusive concepts. Theseare difficult to test because it is almostim- possible to constructcounterexamples,1° not becausenone can be found but because trivialmodifications in the theorycan still save the latter's inclusiveness.
It might be added thatfuzziness, i.e., lack of sharpdefinition and reaction, may prevail ina physical mechanism and thatin spite of this it neednot be inefficient. Organisms functionin this manner
Haavehno's brochure by E.B. Wilson, Review of EconomicStatistics, Vol. vm,Pp. 173.-174, August 1948,in which the advisabilityof using high- powernew Statistical methods isquestioned. Our own positionwas indicated in the text above.
'°lt is not accidental thatthe technique ofusing counterexamples isnot more consciously employed ineconomics. It is of course ofutmost value in mathematics, physics, etc.where precisestatements about relations, facts,etc. are invoLved. But ineconomics it seems alwayspossible to think of plausible "exceptions" whena counterexample is found,or much worse, to demand that the "real meaning"of the author bediscovered rather than thathis words be taken literally. Whenreal exceptionsare found something has beencontributed. When a theory hasto allow formany exceptions it lackscoherence and in- clusiveness anis ripe to be discarded.The aevekipment of valuetheory from labor value theory,with manyexceptions, to marginal utilitytheory, with fewer exceptions, is a good illustrationfrom economics.
10STATISTICAL METHODS AND MATERIALS
in many respects; they safeguard themselves thus against undue
excitement, but when they respond it is done sharply and precisely.
It is not impossible that this behaviormay find some analogy in
our field, but it is too early to say.
(4) The amount of statistical data needed depends on the state
of the theory that can be used n the exploration ofa field. The
better the theory, i.e., the fewer the principles ituses, the fewer
additional statistics are needed to test or advance it. The problem
of the international propagation of business cycles isso unexplored
and vast that very great masses of statistics are needed, many of
which later turn out to be irrelevant; but we know already that
they are almost impossible to obtain and shall see that their value is
not always statisfactory. In the present case even primary data had
to be collected. This task should not have been expected in a study
of this type.
The statistical material used in the following chapters can be
briefly characterized here. A detailed description of the sources,
methods of computations, analysis of the represented activities,
and their comparability for the four countries, United States, Great
Britain, France, and Germany are given whenever a series is newly
introduced.
As in other business cycle studies, monthly data are preferred; it
might have been desirable, but seldom possible, to go over to data
referring to weekly or still shorter intervals. Quarterly or yearly
data were taken only when monthly data were not available, or
when they related to a minor argument, or when they were esti-
mates, or otherwise of such doubtful origin that a monthly series
would merely suggest a degree of accuracy that does not really
exist.
The comparability of the statistics of different countries is one of
the most difficult matters. One is familiar with the difficulty of re-
garding as homogeneous a long series even for one and the same
country. Even when staples are involved and the quality has not
changed much there are changes in diets or technical knowledge
and uses. In the financial field comparability is hard to achieve: the
activities are exceedingly sensitive to changes in custom, law, or
circumvention of law, and they react sharply even to changes in
activities that are represented by other time series, possibly not con-
sidered in our study. The degree of interdependence is high but
cannot be described or measured in advance; it may often not have
been stable over time.
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We should like to coveras long a period as possible. It is difficult
to obtain data for several hundred monthseven for single coun-
tries, let alone for comparable timeseries for four countries. We
have chosen roughly the periods1870-1914 and 1925-1938 or at
least tried to approximate theseas far as possible. Some series start
later than 1870; others might havbeen extended further back, but
the disparities incoverage with other countries would have become
too great. There is avery good material reason for starting in 1870:
from then on (orsoon thereafter) the gold standard was universal
in all four countries and Germanycame into being a year later as
an economic and political unit.
The break inour series for 1914-1925 (except, occasionally,in
truly international series, suchas world gold production or the gold-
silver price ratio) is obviouslyrequired, at least for the actualpe- riod of war. The confusionof the years immediately following
affected especially financialactivities, and exchange rates inparticu- lar. From 1925on greater order reigns again, though thatof the
years before World War I hadnot been regained. Indeed it isone of our results that thekind of international relationsand interac-
tions described byour series had been greatly upset andthat the old structures didnot reestablish themselves, Itis clear from the
outset what complications thiswill bring to any effortto build a coherent and uniform theoryof the international spreadof cycles.
The limitation to four largecountries has no other meaningthan that of convenience, andin a few instances referenceto others, large or small, is also made (forexample, Russia, Japan, SouthAfrica, Argentina, Holland). Thefour countrieswereat least before 1914
undoubtedly the kernel ofworld economic relations.After World War I others beganto loom larger in financialaffairs (especially Japan and some smallerstates such as Switzerlandand Holland) while still othersremoved themselves toa high degree (suchas Russia, and thosecountries which practicedexchange control). It is importantto point out that the choiceof only four sirnilLir
countries (of comparable size!)is not a simplificationof the prob- lem beforeus. Contacts betweena highly developedcountry, say Great Britain, anda less developed one,say Argentina, in the nine- teenth century,were much simpler, becausemore one-sided, than between, say, GreatBritain and France.This is true inparticular for commercialrelations and holdsoften also for financialtransac- tions. These are largelyone-sided flows oflong-term lending from the developedcountry arid an importsurplus from thecapital-
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receiving country.When countries are nearlyof the same degree
of developmefltflows of short-term and long-termfunds frequently
change direction andsometimes even movesimultaneously in op-
posite directions. It isfar more difficult todescribe and interpret
such conditions.
For long periodssimilarity among the countries canbe taken only
cun granosails. Indeed the claim ofsimilarity can be mademainly
regarding the fundamentalattitude toward financial affairsand in-
stitutional setups that express it.The differences in thequantities
involved in the financialtransactions of our fourcountries are
probably much larger andtheir distribution is lessstable than their
institutionS. There hasbeen, all along, the enormousincrease in the
economic weight of theUnited States. There wasalso the impor-
tant reversal of the maindirection of the flows ofcapital: first from
Europe to theUnited States, thenafter the turnof the century
but especially afterWorld War 1from theUnited States to
Europe.
In spite of difficulties toestimate the economic size,weight, or
impact of variouscountries, there is nodoubt that our four were
more nearlyof the same than any otherfour would have been. itis
nowifl spite of thepreoccupation with aggregatequantitiesnot
customary in economicsto attributespecial significance tosize.0
But it will be seen atleast once (in regard tothe gold standard)
that size is a very importantthough tacit, assumptionof some eco-
nomic laws.
Besides the time seriesdescribing activities forthe respective
countries, there are othersshowing relative changesand interconnec-
tions betweenseveral countries. Finallythere are truly "interna-
tional" series.
Quantitative implications areof fundamental importancewhen judging
the success or failure of someeconomic policies. Forexample, a "beggar my
neighbor" policy of currencydevaluation is possible for asmall country in
regard to a large but not vice versa,nor among countriesof the same size.
The problems of size inthe theory of internationaltrade were specifically
treated by F. D. Graham, TheTheory of InternationalValues, Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1948, andearlier. See also the importantpaper by T. M.
Whitin, "Classical Theory,Graham's Theory and LinearProgramming in In-
ternational Trade," QuarterlyJournal of Economics, Vol. LXVII,1953, pp.
520-544.
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Section 3. Theoretical Discussionsof
Business Cycle Transmissions
This section containsa brief discussion of the mostimportant types of theoriesor views as to how cycles and otherfluctuations are transmitted fromone country to another. In section6 some types of the formalways in which the contactbetween countriesmay come about are distinguished.There is a simple relationbetween the two: thetheories try to giveexplanations whichmay fit the formal types thatshould be distinguished.
The bibliographyat the end of thissection (page 16)includes all specific theoreticalwriting that hascome to our knowledge.The line is difficultto draw because thereare comparatively fewin- vestigations dealingspecifically with theinternational spreadof cycles oreven with their internationalaspects. On the otherhand many studies exist, principallyin the field ofinternational trade, that havea bearing on the topicwithout beingspecificallycon- cerned with it.
The existingtheories of the internationaltransmission of business cycles reflect, ofcourse, the great diversitiesof the basictheories for closedeconomies. There severaldichotomies exist.These two are probably themost important: (1)monetary andnonmonetary theories; (2)theories whichattribute contractionand expansion either to changesin investmentactivity or to changesin consump- tion levels. Obviouslyeither of (2)can be monetaryor nonmone- tary. The firstdichotomy isnot perfect since thedivision ofmone- tary andnonnrnnetary theoriesis essentiallya matter of emphasis or convention. Butthere are wideenough divergenciesbetween the monetary andnonmonetary viewso that they can beroughly dis- tinguished. Thesecond dichotomyis at leastas old as the conflict between Ricardoand Maithusand keepson reappearing invarious forms throughoutthe generations.
Whatever theworth of thesedistinctionsmay be, it is almostcer- tain thatmonetary phenomenain the internationalaspects of busi- ness cycles by farovershadoweverything else.Nonmonetary the- ories would bemuch morehandicapped herethan theyare in the domestic field.The restrictionof this studyto financialtransactions is thereforenot a veryserious limitation.





following serious difficulty: the fluctuations of economic activity
connecting several countries, which must even a priori be thought
of as being chiefly responsible for a transmission of cycles,vary in
size enormously. It would be easier to describe the large fluctua-
tions, involving notably such things as devaluations, free exchange
rates, capital flights, going off gold, import prohibitions, quotas,
etc. But such descriptions would suffer from these disadvantages:
the period of observation for modem times when business cycles
under such conditions have been studied is short (essentially 1931-
1939) and a statistical analysis could therefore not go deep. Some
of these events cannot now even be expressed and assessed quanti-
tatively. Finally by omitting the smaller fluctuationwe should de-
prive ourselves of the help that the current theories of business
cycles as a whole, reaching into many parts of economics,are
likely to offer12 (see the end of section 7, below). Furthermore de-
scriptions of this period exist, a period which is also still fresh in
our minds; much of contemporary economics was shaped on that
rudimentatry experience and put to application in economic policy.
The period 1870-1914 is much milder; the disturbances, though
at that time often felt as severe, protracted, and desperate, appear
in the light of the events of the 1930's as moderate. As a rule it is
easier, and would perhaps be preferable, to theorize about larger,
more extreme events, but the above-mentioned circumstances force
us to a consideration of the quieter period.
Here is a brief bibliography; it deals only with writings specifi-
cally devoted to the problem of transmission of economic cycles. It
excludes all works dealing with special aspects, such as the influ-
ence of currency depreciations, import restrictions, tariffs, etc. It
also does not mention those numerous books that contain only in-
cidental discussions of the international aspects of business cycles.
More specialized literature is quoted in subsequent chapters.
'It would be possible, instead of studying either theoretically or statistically
the interaction amongentirecycles, to investigate those large, irregular events
that are more nearly in the nature of catastrophes. This would, for example,
mean a comparative investigation of the international crises of1893. 1907,and
1929-1931. Economic systems, like physical systems, will reveal very important
traits when they are subject toextreme pressureof various sorts. Therefore one
might discover hitherto hidden phenomena of transmission under such condi-
tions. During the years of study such a plan was indeed partly carried out, but
it was ultimately decided that it was better to provide first the over-all picture
dealing more often with milder fluctuations. We may return to the other studies
elsewhere.
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TIlE iNSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
Section 4. The institutional Background and Its Changes
The financial operations among the United States, United King-
dom, France, and Germany must be seen against their general
background and its shifting character.
The great differences between economic life in the period 1870-
1914 and that between the two world wars make it easier to obtain
an appreciation of conditions of the earlier period. The outstand-
ing feature then was a unity of the economic world, largely lost
after 1929; before 1914 there was freedom of travel without pass-
ports, freedom of migration, and freedom from exchange control
and other monetary restrictions. Citizenship was freely granted to
immigrants. Short-term or long-term capital could move unsuper-
vised in any direction, and these movements could take any form.
Direct foreign investments were common and welcome; securities
of other countries were freely traded on most stock exchanges.
Transfer of profits was unhampered and foreign investments were
not confiscated after they had begun to show yield.
Monetary standards in most countries were firmly established on
gold arid no economic crisis occurred that would have given rise to
the belief that a country might be "pushed off gold" by badly func-
tioning price systems. Doubts about the gold standard came only
from the political propaganda for bunetalism fiat money but not
from a belief that the gold standard mechanism could not cope
with whatever difficulties one was accustomed to foresee. Neither
was there the notionat least not in Europethat this monetary
system imposed restraints or hardships upon the various economies
such that they would be unable to shake off depressions.
Indeed the monetary systems of some countries were tied to-
gether even more firmly by international monetary unionse.g. the
Latin Unionorganized so that the money of each member state
could circulate freely at par in all other member states. Gold coins
of all countries found their way easily in all directions. Some coun-
tries, e.g. in South America, for simplicity's sake used British
gold Sovereigns in lieu of their own currency)3
This must be contrasted with the state of monetary affairs after
'3This had great but little recognized significance for British monetary policy
and, of course, for relating fluctuations of those countries with British cycles.
For want of space our material on these matters remains uripublihed.
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World War I.'Immediately after the end of the war confusion
reigned, great inilations occurred,some of a hitherto ummagined
magnitude (Germany, Russia, Austria, Poland, etc.) butan effort
to return to earlier conditions was made and proved fairlysuccess-
ful from about 1925 to 1931. The gold standardwas partly restab-
lished but, thoughmany of its operations were seemingly the same,
a subtle change had occurred through the introduction of goldex-
change standards (mostly in othercountries) which caused a dan-
gerous pyramid of credits and a new interlocking ofeconomies thus
far unknown onso large a scale. It became apparent only when in
1931 the system of international credits brokedown and disrupted
the exchange of goods andcurrencies so that the level of world
trade fell__as faras can be ascertainedbelow the level it had
reached before World War 1.15
In addition the situationwas further complicated by the problem
of German reparations.Large amounts had originally been fixed;
they were later scaled downwardrepeatedly, and paymentswere
essentially made through large loansfloated in Great Britain and
the United States. Thesize of these operations overshadowedany- thing that had happenedwithin comparable time intervalsbefore
1914. This kind of internationalborrowing coupled withpayments of tribute falls outside theoperations that the international mech-
anisni had supported earlier. Theflows of capitalwere now more
often than before WorldWar I political and sometimesunder tacit or open control of governmentsor at least central banks.
Earlier, capitalmovements had been large too, but theyfollowed essentially routes that seemedto secure steady and unhampered
international trade. The traderoutes provided forever-increasing exchanges of the products ofthe whole world, therebytying na- tions closer together. Indeedideas of economicself-sufficiency hardly playedany practical role, and certainlywere not policy- forming. Internationaltrade had toovercome tariffs, but in the
1An excellent account of theperiod may be found in"International Cur. rency Experience, Lessons ofthe Inter-War Period,"League of Nations, 1944, The major part of thiswork is by R. Nurkse.
Studies of a more specializedcharacter are: E. L Duties,The French Franc, New York, 1929; F. D.Graham, Prices andProductirn in Hypes-Inflation Princeton University Press,1934; C. Bresciani.Turroni,The Economics of Inflation, London, 1937;W. A. Brown, Jr., TheInternatjon(jl Gold Standard Reinteipreted, Nationaj Bureauof Economic Research,1940. In spite of the increasein the number ofcountries which transportedformer domestic into foreign fradelSuch countrieswere, in Europe alone, Finland,the three Baltic States, Poland,Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.THE INSTiTUTiONAL BACKGROUND
light of those of more recent years or decades they were exceed-
ingly low. There were hardly any quantitative restrictions on inter-
national trade (quotas, import prohibitions, etc.)In short it was
a world widely different from the one between the two world wars;
it was a world of which recently many, and now perhaps more,
would have been inclined to assert that it could not be created be-
cause it could never work.1T
It is also noteworthy that international financial and commercial
transactions before 1914 were among individuals (and corpora-
tions) and rarely among countries dealing as a whole. This is a
corollary to the absence of quotas and the like and the prevalence of
tariffs, if any. These operate merely like freight rates and there-
fore goods could be moved whenever price differentials were fa-
vorable. National boundaries were thus of small importance, as was
the fact that most countries had different currencies. Indeed the
theoiy of international trade encountered great difficulties when it
tried to show precisely where the peculiarities of international
trade separated it from domestic. This similarity went so far that
some authors considered both to be special cases of the problem of
regional trade. On the other hand the theory of international trade
not only remained largely within the domain of the antiquated
theory of labor value but also persisted in treating the relations of
two and more countries as if they were trading as units rather than
through their individuals.'8 However in the special case of financial
were beginnings of political quarrels. A good example were the
squabbles over Serbian hogs between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, where all
sorts of tricks were resorted to. What was then an anomaly became a standard
after World War I. In both cases wars followed.
It should be borne in mind that czarist Russia and the Ottoman Empire,
both autocratic states, could not be included in this picture of freedom of
movement for men, goods, and money as far as Europe is concerned. The same
applies to Japan and to the interior of China.
Travel without passports, immigration, and settlement otherwise were pos
sible all over the worldcertainly a different world compared with anything
known since 1914! Some countries, like Canada, even paid the fare of imrni-
grants from distant continents. This one illustration alone, if properly thought
over, and, for example, compared with the current Immigration rules of the
United States, should serve more than any further elaboration can do to
demonstrate the profound difference in world economic relations and in the
economic ideologies even of countries purporting to adhere to free enterprise
and nonintervention.
In that respect the theory is even today inadequate inasmuch as these situa-
tions are describedlike all exchanges between 2, 3, 4,. .. individualsasif
simple maximwn problems were given. However they are not maximum prob-
lems at all but complicated mixtures of such; they can therefore not be
treated In the conventional manner. Cf. John von Neumann and 0. Morgenstem,
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relations the analyst is largely independent of the laborvalue as.
sumption as well as of the notion that nations deal with eachother
as units. Instead the underlying picture does conform withthe
assumption of individual contacts carried out through themedium
of large open markets.
Control of varying degreewas exercised over financial operations,
speaking now only of the period before1914 (cf. pages 364 if.).
Its existence is oftenvery difficult to determine. For example it is
common knowledge that the Bank of Englandrepeatedly intimi-
dated the commercial banks byshowing displeasure atsome acts;19
such warnings were heeded lest directsanctions and squeezes might
be applied. The other centralbanks were not better in thatrespect,
though all of themdenied the existence of nonmarketpractices. In the United Statessome of the central bank functionswere assumed
by the Treasury but themarket control was always weakand un-
certain. The beginnings ofattempts to control the business cycles
or at least special phasesor parts and appearances of itwerepres- ent in the different countries.Some, like the farmore ancient open
market policy, easily fittedinto the monetary mechanism.
But in general,governments, while interfering increasinglyin economic matters (perhapsmost in Germany, least in theUnited States), did not conducta real and deliberate business cyclepolicy in the modern theoreticalsense. They interfered in particularcrises only to withdrawagain swiftly. Individualinstances of the ad- vocacy and sometimeseven application of policies ofmore ad- vanced nature are, however,found in the forty-oddyears preceding World War I, suchas the idea of compensatorybudgets, public works, buffer stocks,etc. Some of theseeven go back to the old Egyptians and are describedin the Bible.
Another characteristicof the period that hasat least to bemen- tioned is the largeincrease in populationin the chief industrial
Countries. There was botha natural increase and insome states an
Theory of Games an4Economic Behavjoi,Princeton University Press,1944, 3rd ed., 1957, Chap.1.
It is interesting tonote that the theoiy haspreserved its originalstate. monopoliflcmercantj.jc outlook(though the subjectmatter has tempo- rarily changed profound1y)_.j0
developing techniquesadequate for the analysis of monopoly.
Such behavior of theBank of England isreally in violation ofthe rules of the game as generallyunderstood; they marka wide divergence from the quantitative credit control thatw egedly._..excljve1ypracticed during e gold standard period.
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increase by immigration also, notably in the United States. The in-
crease supported many rising trendsin production, consumption
of food, etc.the migrations linked countries previously in loose
contact. New flows of money were initiated through huge immi-
grants' remittances (e.g. horn the United States to Italy) so that
the balances of payments of the receiving countries were greatly
affected. It was notorious that shipping profited from emigrants
perhaps more even than from the ever-expanding world trade.
The general competitive economic expansion was accompanied
by the increase or creation of colonial empires with the natural
consequences of political tension among the colonizing powers.
There were colonial wars but they did not leave deep scars. There
were also other wars such as the Spanish-American, the Russo-
Japanese, and the Balkan war, but they were localized and occurred
at the periphery of economic centers. In some European countries
standing armies did call for great armament industries and the race
for naval superiority between Great Britain and Germany had great
influence upon some industries. In the United States these factors
played a negligible role.
The aforementioned countries were institutionally the most simi-
lar in the world (of the larger countries) during the period 1870-.
1914 and probably still so after World War I. Others may have been
in much more intimate relationships, but this would not be typical
and would create an additional, different problem (such as the rela-
tionship between, say, Great Britain and Denmark). In these latter
cases we speak of a complementarity relation based on division of
labor. These relations are important and interesting, but the case
of the similar countries (cf. page 22) offers greater inducements.
If complementarity exists and the size of the two countries is as
widely different as that of Great Britain and Denmark, then this
case becomes more akin to a regional relationship.
If the (weaker) relationships of similarity between countries of
more nearly the same size exist, then the problems withwhich we
are dealing arise in full force. If it should turn out,however, that
the closeness of relationship in this field is not so great as is com-
monly assumed, a significant fact would be established. Similarity
need not imply close contacts, but these are quickly established
among freely trading countries. If it were a similarity among state
monopolies and autocratic countries, then we might have similarity
with few and minor contacts. But such conditions did not prevail
before 1914_at least not among our four countriesalthough after
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1925 they began to develop. TheSoviet Union was so organized
from the beginning and inspite of its immense size played onlya
negligible role in the trade of all othernations (approximately two
to three per cent or less in world trade).
Lack of contactamong nations where contact is to beexpected would lead one tocarry the investigation further into the fieldof those (possibly alsoinstitutional) factors which wouldaccount for
the difference in closeness.These might sometimes be ofa less
tangible but nonetheless powerfulnature. They might, forexample, lie in deliberate policies,in variations in the spirit ofenterprise, in
differences of population growth.These would then be factorsthat would hare to be addedto the other institutionalones which were
similar. In other words,aside from the objective, physicaldiffer- ences, the same formal institutionscan be made use of in widely
different ways.
It is a commonsource of misinterpretation of historicalevidence to consider only thestructural, static side ofinstitutions as laid down in formal rules,charters, etc. What reallymatters is how they are handled andenforced. This becomesthe more important the greater the latitudewhich the rulesmay, even expressly, leave to the functioningorgans.
In the field of financethis point of view becomesparticularly sig. nificant. It is likely thatthe customs (usances)of financial markets differed more widelythan their objective(physical) institutions. We shallencounter several instances ofthis. It is impossible,how. ever, to take them fullyinto account becausetoo little is known. Here is a veryimportant field foreconomic research.
SimiJar countries"imply, ofcourse, that theyare essentially comparable, also as faras their generaleconomic development is concerned. This enablesus to assume, e.g., thatcertain short-terni and long-terminterest rates reallyperform as nearly thesame function as is technicallypossible (althoughtheir namesmay be quite different). Ifa complementar.ityrelationship obtains,then there need beno similarity among theorganizations and the de- velopment of therespective countries.
A colony is bothundeveloped anddissimilar; it neednot be com- plementary either.In the relationbetween GreatBritain and Den- mark, on the otherhand, we havetwo highly developedeconomies, but also greatdisSimilarity, insofaras the first countryis large and chiefly industrial,the latter smalland PredominantlyagricWtwalTRANSMISSION OF SHOCKS AND CYCLES
The same degree of development is thus a necessary but not asuf-.
ficient condition for similarity.
Section 5. TransmissionofShocks and Cycles
We are interested primarily in first describing andthen interpret-
ing the transmission of economic fluctuationsfrom one country to
another. This is evidently a much more complicated enterprisethan
merely to compare the cyclical behavior of various important
economies. The comparison is, however, the first step2° and may
help us to formulate hypotheses about the discovery and the nature
of transmissions.
Obviously fluctuations need not be transmitted from one country
to another. The countriesalthough openmayhave such weak
links that whatever stimulus is received by one is easilyand en-
tirely swallowed up by the much stronger domestic forces. Orthe
size of the countries and the magnitude of afluctuation may be so
different that transmissions become wholly one-sided. Yetfor other
reasons, there may be a great similarityin the nature and timing of
their cycles, and even a more than superficial inspectionof the
statistical materials might support any number of hypotheses. Coin-
parison of the similarity of unconnected, differentcycles in various
suitably chosen countries has at any rate the great meritof greatly
increasing the number of cases upon whichgeneralizations about
economic fluctuations can be based. We study successivecycles
within one country and try to generalize about them,although we
have to bear in mind ultimately that they are probablyinterrelated
and that structural changes affecting them haveoccurred. These
same factors have, naturally, also tobe considered when comparing
cycles of different countries in which the differences inthe institu-
tional setups probably weigh more than their (unknown oronly
partly known) interrelatedness. And finally, consecutive institu-
tional changes have happened in all countries, sometimesin the
same general direction (e.g., greaterdevelopment of the money
and credit economy everywhere).
If it is at all true that every business economy with extensive use
A science that has to make extensive use ofcomparative analysis is in an
early state of its development. It Is an indicationthat its proper method of re-
search has not yet been found. An illustration is offered by biology,which until
recently was in this condition.
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of money and credit necessarily exhibits rhythmic fluctuations,then,
given a sufficiently large number of countries, it isnot surprising to
find several countries in thesame phase of the cycle. This is indeed
what the "conspectus of business cycles"2'shows. It constitutes
valuable information becauseit tends to corroborate the thesis of the
necessity of fluctuations. But it doesnot allow us to determine ri.
which cycles of thesecountries, being in the same phase,22are
caused by separate forces,or by the same forces affecting them
together, or are transmitted bysome to others, that may or may
not belong to the samegroup, i.e., which are in the same phase. sdf It is convenient to distinguishthree types of transmission ofeco-
nomic fluctuations in the order ofrising difficulties of assumptions:
(1) Inducement of shocks.The most natural idea is to thinkof
an erratic shock (e.g., panic,var, inflation) that is imparted by
one country to another. The firstcountry is thus itself exposed toa random disturbance whichit transmits as such to others. Thereis
undoubtedly evidence ineconomic history for this type. Indeedit is one that has attractedthe interest of economic historians,just as the theory ofeconomic fluctuations originated in thestudy of in- dividual cthes anddisturbances the successiveinterrelations of which were seen only aftera long time.
In order to be ableto speak of a "shock,"a minimal intensity of the
disturbance must be postulated.That may differ for thevarious
(3 countries widely, dependingon their size and themomentary state of business. A shockmay, for the receiving country,merely be a certain minimum sizeor amplitude of a disturbanceabroad which if milder, wouldnot cause any difficulty.
It will makea big difference whether thisshock, producingex pansionary or contractionai.yresults, comes duringan upturn or a downturn of the domesticeconomy, which of itsparts is directly affected, and what themagnitude and duration ofthe shock is.23 Evidently thesevariables can assumea great number of values,and many significant combinationsare possible. Theiranalysis would consist essentially ina breaking down ofaggregates and in dis-
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tinguishing many channels through which influences become active,
precisely as was done in the beginning, and still incomplete, applica-
tion of Cantillon's theorem in monetary theory.
(2) Shock-induced Cycles. An isolatedshock ofsufficient
strength could give rise to a full cycle in the receiving country if
it came at an opportune moment. This may, forexample, be quite
typical if the origin of the disturbance is a war abroad. Onemight
be inclined to speak of the transmission of a cycle in this case,while
in fact a cycle was merely induced by a much shorter movement,
itself noncyclical. This is certainly a more complex formof rela-
tionship between the two countries than if the shock causesonly
internal disturbances in the second country, as random in nature
as the initial occurrence inthe first country. In many ways it is a
very natural assumption, especiallyif the shock is large,24 as for
example, in wartime. Neutral countries are exposed to thiskind of
influence and as a rule they go thr3ugh an inflationary expansion
during, and a contraction after, the war though in amilder form
than the warring nations. Other cases, not related tovar, could
probably be found. The empirical verification of this assumption
is difficult, especially if all countries, or at leastthe receiving coun-
try, experience cycles anyway so thatonly a modification of their
basic, underlying cycle occurs.
(3) Transmission of Complete Cycles. Thecomplete cycles of
two or more countries are dependent uponeach other. This would
entail dependency phase by phase, with perhaps some constant or
varying shift in timing and with effects runningfrom almost com-
plete parallelism to almost complete inversion of phases inthe two
countries.
Under this assumption very much more is impliedthan in the
preceding two cases. The elements whose variationshave to be
studied have multiplied enormously. A very closeform of contact
between the respective countries must exist, andthe nature of the
contact should be made fully explicitby empirical investigations.
The idea of continuous influence throughoutthe two cycles,
which necessarily must be made, while strong, isweaker than the
assumption that this influence is itselfvariable, i.e., the closeness of
this (continuous) influence can itself besubject to (possibly even
24A precise and complete definition of a shockwould have to contain quan-
titative statements about the minimum and maximumstrength, duration of the
impulse, etc. But we need not concern ourselves withthis here. In economics
this formal possibility seems to have beenmentioned first by K. Wicksell.
It is of course common in physics, fromwhere the idea was taken.
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cyclical) variations. Whether cyclicalor not, this important possi.
bility is in thenature of an extension of the remark at theend of (1). It is likely that themutual influences exercised by theecono- mies of two countriesare stronger when both are highin cyclical
expansion than when theyare both around the lower turning point.
For example,an economy is far more susceptible todisturbances when it is late ina boom, and soon afterward, than whenexpecta- tions are low butnot deteriorating, prices and interestrates have
stopped falling, and thereare good possibilities for expansion with
a large supply of laboron hand.
Similarly whenone country is still contracting and theother already expanding, thefirst may receivea stimulus from the seo- ond or itmay pull down the second'sexpansion. The conjunction of a food harvest in onecountry with a bad one in anothermay ac- complish a turn,as isvell known from European-nerican experi- ence, e.g., in the l890's.
One of thereasons why variations in the speed,direction, and extent of a transmissionof fluctuationsmay occur lies in the fact
also observed fornational cyclesthatsome forces begin to operate perceptibly only atcertain stages of the cycle. Forexample, when credit facilitiesat home become lessample, many turn abroadfor additional capital; thesame is true for the demand forraw mate- rials, etc. So it is onlyafter definite stages havebeen reached that the activity inone country springsover to another_.depe-ingof course, upon the simultaneouscondition of businessactivity there. The number ofpossibilities, especiallywhen severalcountries are involved, is very largeindeed.
Finally two otherforms of possibletransmission may fitone or the other ofcases (1) to (3).
(a) There is thepossibility of transmissionby imitation.Difficult to establish statistically,it is of importanceespecially in the finan- cial field. Variousattempts to builda psychological theory ofna- tional business cycleshave been made.They have incommon the stimulus exercised byone successfuJ developmentupon other pos- sibilities, so thatone cumulativeprocess tends to set another,paral- lel one intomotion. In theinternational field,too, there is wide room for a similar playof psychologjcajfactors. A briskupward movement of stock marketprices in onegreat financialcenter has often causedsimilar price riseselsewhere, thoughthere may have been little direct,physicalconnection throughinterrnarket sales
26
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between the movement on the leading market and the others.28
The psychological infection can proceed very rapidly. Simultaneous
(or almost simultaneous) turning points (especially upper turning
points) in different countries might sometimes be accounted for in
this manner when there were no visible signs of a transmission
through more familiar physical channels, such as foreign trade.
(b) Summation of Foreign Influences. An economy is exposed to
influences emanating simultaneously from several other countries.
Each single stimulus may be comparatively weal, some may can-
cel out, but the others may add up to great strength. The various
single movements may fall in any one of the three types distin-
guished on pages 24 if. so that a still wider variety of types of influ-
ence has to be accounted for.26 These would all be more realistic
than those earlier simplified types and, as in every approach to
fuller reality, the difficulties increase at a tremendous rate.
This may be likened to the determination of the common effects
in a given area of a pond into which at various distances from that
area stones of different size, from different heights, and at various
intervals are thrown. The task would be to determine the interfer-
ence of the different waves and to describe the upheaval in the
original zone. No physicist, even having access to electronic com-
puters, would enjoy this computation.2
If these impulses are continuous or at least regular, though inter-
mittent, they mayperhaps even periodicallycumulate in an in-
ternationally induced cycle of the country in question, or in an
international business fluctuation" within one and the same coun-
try.28 That is why a deepening of the studies of this problem might
The New York Stock Exchange opens during the closing minutes of the
London Stock Exchange and for long periods generally took its lead from the
closing prices there. The London Stock Exchange, in turn, starts with the in-
formation of the previous closinprices in New York, etc. See Chapter X for
the phenomenon of "Imitation.' Internationally traded securities, woefully
neglected in studies on International finance (cf. Chapter X, section 2), arc a
powerful link between the various national stock markets.
Nshall entirely neglect the question whether the summation of influ-
ences emanating from different countries Is additive or not, In whichlatter
case still further, very serious difficulties arise. They areof the same type as
those encountered in the composition of individual time series from their
individual components. The problems of the generation of cycles fromrandom
disturbances and their summation have been investigated mathematically.
Although hydrodynamics Is enviably far advanced, compared with any-
thing in economics!
NAbout regional studies and their relation to the theory of business cycles,
cf. especially various papers by ft Vining. But the concept of a geographical
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contribute to our understanding of the international relationships.
To give an example, there can be little doubt, despitepermanent
differences in interest rates between theeast and the \vest, that the
money markets of New York and San Francisco aremore closely
related to each other than the New Yorkmoney market is to the
New York clothing industryor building trade. The same applies)
Inutats mulandis, to San Francisco and the respectiveindustries of
that city. And the connections between theNew York and San
Francisco construction tradesare at the same time practically nil
(with present technology).
The better developedare two national economies that come into
contact with each other, themore numerous will these special chan-
nels be. But they willnot all have the same significance. Especially
will they be of differentimportance, depending upon the direction
in which the influence flows. Ifcountry A imports from country Ba
given raw material (whichmay be B's chief export,29 or at least its
chief export to A) it willcertainly be susceptible to the fluctuations
in the output of thatraw material. But this raw material is onlyone of many and perhaps) besideshaving substitutes, enters intomany
different uses and industriesin A. Hence there is widespreaddiffu-
sion of these fluctuations inraw material output.
The explanation of thecontact between two ormore countries is of course given by thesupposed mechanism thatconstitutes the object of the theory; thiswas discussed in section 3. Assume then
that we had foundseveral such mechanisms.There arise among others these questions,(a) to what sort ofstress they can be sub- jected, and (b) whetherthe number of thesemechanisms is neces- sarily stable.
Regarding (a): eachmechanism will operate byvariation of the factors through whichit functions. For example,if exchange rates are for long periodsnear one of the gold points, theresponse to changes of therate may be different thanwhen the rate isnear parity, etc. Someeconomic mechanisms willwork properly only if the variouscomponent economies are ofsome acceptable relative size to each otlier.°
region differs considerably fromour plesent notion, whichaims at overcoming the restrictions of thatnature. There is a relationshipin the two attempts and it is better to stress thatrather than the differences.
The Philippinesare a case in point: copra isits main export but thecountry does not control itsprice.
' is particularly true of thegold standard. Itseems to be a question that was largely neglected.
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Regarding (b): it is likely that eachmechanism of transmission
will stand only a certainmaximum variation of factors without
breaking down and causinganother one to be put in its place. These
maxima are not easilydetermined, if known at all, though their
existence is almostcertain. The strains to which the differentgold
standard mechanisms (as forms onwhich the transmission depends)
can beexposed arc definitely limited. There are, forexample, the
amounts of gold reserves,the limits of the compressibility of prices
(especially wage rates and wageincomes), etc. if these stresses
are exceeded,other monetary systems, such as managed currencies,
take the place of the goldstandard. Gold exchange standards have
different limits. One may assumethe number of possible mech-
anisms to be large.
The contacts between cycles indifferent countries can therefore
change (1) because of the more orless intensive use of the facilities
offered by a given mechanism, or (2)by transition to another tech-
nique, where again the variationsof type (1) may occur.3'
The speedofthe transmission of fluctuations for eachmechanism
is an exceedingly importantissue that influences especiallythe
choice and treatment of the statisticsand the character of the
time series (see the discussionof arbitrage exchange series in
Chapter V). These speeds(which often, but not necessarily, are
the speeds of reactions to stimulidiffer greatly with the various
spheres. They are great in the majorparts of the financial field,
possibly also in the area of someforeign-trade transactions (e.g.
raw materialmarkets), slower as far asemigrants' remittances
are concerned, andin the case of direct investments(though these
latter two are financialoperations!), etc. In each case manyob-
servations intist be made thathave a direct bearing upon the
statistical requirements. We mention onethat supplements what
was said on page10: Clearly the data shouldbe for a time unit
shorter than the reactionperiod. This will be difficult, nay im-
possible, in those important caseswhere arbitrage plays an effective
part; this is true of exchangerates, interest rates,gold prices, and
gold movements, etc.; in short, inalmost all fields which weshall
have to touch. Instead we have to usedata of vastly longer in-
tervals. This has an importantbearing upon the interpretationof
our series.32 Withoutconsideration of the speeds ofreaction, simple
It would be wrong, however, to assumethat the transition from one
mechanism to another could (orwould normally) only happen under stress,
i.e., after a given one hasproved to be Inadequate.
For example, the successive observationscan, with somefurther restrictions,
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criteria as to what constitutes satisfactory datain respect to the
time intervals are apt to fail A speed ofreaction on the other
hand is a concept thatcannot be well formulated withoutSome model showing interaction.
Unfortunately the entire field is little explored.The traditional
equilibrium theory has not incorporatedinvestigations intovary- ing speeds of reactionsto economic changesand it probablyis not able to do so systematically. Theseare all quantitativeques-. tions of great complexity, becauseit is likely that thereaction speeds are not constants butvary (in the same direction)with the magnitudes of the changesobserved. Thus atransmission from
country to country may be greatlyspeeded up if at thebeginning the events suddenlyassume great magnitude.
The types of contactamong national economiesare apt to become fewer, ifaggregatesare formed of economicquantities. Which degree ofsimplification to choose andat what price isa question that can beanswered only in practicalexperience and it will largely dependon the nature of the statisticalmaterial. As one result of theformation ofaggregates, one is led toexpect at given times a clear-cutflow of influencesin one direction only. But one mustnot exclude the fact thatat the same time,even within the same financialaggregate, movementsgo in the opposite direction. Long-termcapital, for example,moving from countryA to country B, andimmigrants' remittancesmay both be transferred in the directionopposite to the flow ofcapital from B destinedto be invested inan active stock exchange ofA. This situationis likely to prevail in thefinancial sphere, wherethe various channels, though theycominumcate quite well witheach other, oftenrelate to widely differentactivities (even withinone and the samecoun- try). Immigrantssend theirremittances at times whenthey have saved up, or whenneeds abroad develop,and not just whena short-term flow is alsoproper in the same direction.All this would be buried underchanges of "net"positions. Price levelchanges may have more to dowith the timewhen proceeds of lonter
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loans are used than with the level of long-term interestrates at that
moment, etc.
Thus we ask: how, for any separate field (as, for example, the
credit voiwne), can one isolate quantitatively, theautonomous
(national) from the internationally induced changes? Thestatistics
show the total phenomenon which isa composite of these two
groups of influences. Is the composition additive or does it obey
a more complicated principle?
Their separation would be analogous to the disentanglement of
various components working upon a given single series within
one country alone. If the separation of these components had been
achieved fully and if powerful methodswere available, could one
be expected to take the additional, and perhaps bigger, step? This
is therefore the inverse process of aggregation, a problem akeady
encountered above.
With all due regard for the work so far done, these aidsare not
available. Even where such familiar questionsas the unique
separation of seasonal, random, and trend fluctuations from cyclical
for a single time series are dealt with, much uncertainty stillpre-
vails. The reason is, of course, that these questionsare not simple
at a1l.
"Perhaps the clearest and most penetrating treatment of the chief logical
difficulties involved in the decomposition of time series is to be found in the
first cha,pter of A. Wald, "Berechnung und Ausschaltung von Saisonschwan-
kungen, inBeitragezur Konjunkfurforschung, Vol. ix, Vienna, 1936.
Wald distinguishes between the "external" and "internal" definitions of the
various components. The first give our general,intuitive, and descriptive
knowledge, the second are mathematical expressions approaching the fonner
as well as possible. Ideally the two should coincide, which is another way of
saying that our external definitions should be of a quantitative nature and
should enable us to state also quantitatively what is meant by the "influence"
or 'effect" of each component upon the entire series. Of course we are far
from being able to do this completely in economic statistics even in the much
studied field of seasonal variations. Therefore we must by further descriptions
try to make our external definitions ever more complete, hoping that thus bet-
ter and better suited (i.e., very narrowly delimited) corresponding mathe-
matical expressions can be substituted for them. These are chosen from a
naturally infinite number of available mathematical functions.
In the analogous case in the text requiring segregation of the international
component in the variations of our time series we must first supply external
descriptions, possibly even external definitions, and show that a strong case
for their plausibility can be made.
A discussion of the logic of decomposition of time series, together with a
more detailed study of the nature of cumulative processes (e.g., 'feedbacks")
and their implications for statistical work cannot be given here. The author
hopes to he a'ble to publish his studies of these matters at another occasion.
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When factors are isolated as those through which foreignin-
fluences pass, itvilI be observed that some of the time series thus
formed show frequent and perhaps extensive variations whileothers
may run a more even course. The first are thereafter calledsensi-
tive and the second insensitive (or rigid). This iscustomary, for
example, in price analysis. It is advisable, however,not to use
this terminology freely, because it is beset withmany diffIculties
and a great deal of vagueness thatseems to have escaped attention
so far. In order to classify phenomena asmore or less "sensitive,"
the strength and continuity (or frequency)of the force operating
upon the elements, about whose sensitivity statementsare made,
must be described and measured.
If, of two economicquantities, one moves in wideramplitude than the other ormore frequently within a given unit of time,we
still have to give meaningto the statement that the first ismore
sensitive or elastic. Wemust observe more. It may be thatthe forces operatingupon the latter have been incomparablyweaker
or occurred less frequently and thatit responded exceedinglywell to them.
Movements of one quantitymay precede those of anotherand then we use the wordsensitivity in regard to this lead-lagrelation- ship. Such observationscan be valuable, but if not fittedin a body of thoroughlyunderstood interdependencies,they can proveto be quite misleading. Theyare only of symptomatic nature,signaling the arrival of changeelsewhere; therefore theseleading seriesmay be of minorimportance taken by themselves.
But we hope thata contribution can be madetoward givingsome of these notions ofsensitivity to internationalinfluences better empirical foundationas we go along. We shall findthat the "effort series," measuring thestress upon internationalmoney markets, comes nearest to the desiredsensitive series (cf. ChapterVII).
Section 6. WorldEconomy and WorldBu.sine.ss Cycles
In scientific andpopular literatureone encounters often the notion of a worldeconomy, and statementsabout the "worldeco- nomic situation," the"world crisis,""world businesscycle," etc. The attemptwas even made toestablish aseparate discipline of "world economics."Statistical yearbookslist "worldprices," figures on world production,and the like.Production figuresoffer no difficulties, since theyare obviously onlythesummations of theWORLD ECONOMY AND BUSINESSCYCLES
outputs in different nations or regions. But whatsome of the other
notions mean is not so clear. For example, whatare world prices
and world markets? And where does the world businesscycle occur?
What is its relation to all the domestic cyclesover the whole
world?
Consider first world markets and the worldeconomy: of these
two notions the first one is least objectionable and indeedoffers
no particular difficulties. World markets exist for cotton,copper,
wheat, sugar, coffee, etc. but not for labor,buildings, railroads,
etc. The former are markets within specificcountries that are
directly open to the business of othercountries. The transactions
at these markets may move goods that are alreadyin the country
where the market is located, butmore often the trade may concern
shipments from second to third Countries. Then thesemarkets are
more truly markets of the world. The respective domestic markets
in other countries (and sometimes that of still othersnot involved
directly in the transactions) orient themselvesto the events at
these dominating places. The interrelationship ofthese dominating
markets for different commodities is difficultto describe, if only
because they also communicate intimatelywith the domestic
economy of which they form an integral part.
The usually highly competitive world marketsare situated in
different countries, although Great Britain did, before1914, have
a majority of them. There must be free interactionamong the
different countries. Sometimes thecenters shift from one country
to another, as, e.g., sugar from Liverpool to Bremen. Suchshifts
are usually the expression of deep-lying changes in production,
or transportation, or in the financial setup ofa country. World
markets exist mostly for staples, like grain, wool,cotton, sugar,
coffee, etc.; but also such objectsas diamonds must be mentioned
where, however, there isa world cartel. As soon as diversification
of products or a decrease in their mobility(often identical)is
noted it becomes impossible to speak of world markets.This is
notably the case for labor. The prices of these factorsmay never-
theless exercise influenceupon each other, but only in the very
indirect way of affecting price levels, prices ofexport and import
goods, etc.
From the point of view of the individualeconomy not every-
thing that occurs outside it is part of that "worldeconomy" to
which the daily parlance refers; it is true merely ofa few of these
outside events. The "world economy"may therefore simulfaneously
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represent something quite different for differenteconomies and
even for different parts of the sameeconomy. The money market
of country A may be linkedto those of countries B and C, butits
raw material market with those of countriesD and E, the market
for finished ex-port goodswith still another set of countries,etc.
For countries B,C,...the arrangementsmay be different again.
Hence the interrelationshipof even a few countriescan conform to a rather complicatedstructure, the question being, ina more
appropriate terminology, to determine whichnational markets
intersecti.e., have elements incommonwith which otherna- tional markets in thesense of actual trading, arbitrage,imitation and orientation.
To specify further: influencesexercised upon a givencommunity from, say, the "worldmoney market" always originate ultimately
in particular nationalmoney markets; sales for export to theworld market mean ultimatelyexports to specific countries,etc. It is always possible inprinciple to identify thesevarious national markets and as a ruleit will be desirable to doso.
An exception must bemade, however, fora few international series which describeeconomic activities thatcannot be uniquely attributed to any particularcountry. Such a case is offeredby the tramp freightersthat roam theseas and take any business that
comes their way. Norwegianshipping, for example,largely per- formed such functions.The profits enter theNorwegian balance of payments, the transactionsthemselves those ofmany other Coun- tries. One mighttherefore expect figuresof this type (shipping, cargoes, line and tramp shippingvolume, freightrates, marine insurance rates andvolume, traffic throughinternational canals, andlast but notleastreceipts and profitsof international gambling casinos)to give an excellentdescription of "worldcon- ditions." Suchseries are exceedinglydifficult to collect.They do not always showinternational turningpoints and the likevery clearly but havenevertheless great valuein that direction. Itturns out that in many instancestheir turningpoints seem to begoverned more by wars andtrend-factors than bythe cyclical changesin the countriesto which they refer.3
If it is difficultor even impossibleat present to speakunambigu- ously of a worldbusiness cycle, whatthen shall be doneabout
The author has collectedsuch series, but forwant of space theyare not published in this workas is some other materialpertaining to gold, goldpoints,
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dating the events so that a simultaneousoccurrence or a trans-
mission of fluctuations can be discovered, measured,and inter-
preted? If there were a world businesscycle, then we should
be able to determine its properties bya thorough statistical analysis.
These could then be compared with the nationalreference cycles.
In this manner the national cycles could be analyzedin respect to
leads, lags, and amplitudesse ina comparison with these convenient
international cycles.
As a first step this would be exactly analogousto the analysis
of a (national) time series with respectto its reference cycle. The
various national reference cycles would stand in thesame relation-
ship to the international that the specific cyclesenjoy with respect
to the national reference cycle. This would give farmore informa-
tion than a mere conspectus of reference cyclesin various coun-
tries, in which these are simply and directly compared withan-
other.
Extending this approach further, letus consider some possi-
bilities that can easily he tested and willseem intuitively plausible.
They are natural applications and extensions of whatwas said in
section 6 about the specific forms of contactsamong different
national economies and of specific spheres belongingto several
ones.
Thus the reference cycle of country Amay serve as the "inter-
national" reference cycle for countries B,C,D, etc. if the changesin
the economic conditions in country A constitute those "world"
influences that matter for the others, in comparison with which the
influences from E,F,... can be neglected. This is evidently the
case when the economy of country B is essentially "dominated" by
that of country A. It might have occurredsome time in the past
between, say, Creat Britain and Argentina. Then Argentina'sex-
ports of a few staples, its chief products, did not depend onlyon
specific British markets but (as in the case of Argentina's meat
and wheat) chiefly on the variations of the vast aggregate income
of British consumers. Fluctuations in British consumers' income, in
turn, can be explained only in terms of the entire, complex ma-
chinery of the forces that generate a British business cycle (which
in its turn will also be highly influenced from abroad). In this
case British reference dates will have to be used when measuring
the significance of fluctuations in Argentina's exports and deter-
Theoretically only; present reference cycles do not yield infonnation about
amplitudes, but another method might, e.g., when national incomes can be used.
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mining the main "international" influences for the Argentinian
economy.
The situation is fundamentally the same when the countriesare
complementary only in a few specific lines of productionor other
markets. Then the movements of a particular times series ofcountry
Adescribing the changes, say, ina single industryas represented
by that industry's specic cycle would show the chief"interna-
tional" influence for country B. For thatreason the characteristics
of that specific cycleand not those of A's referencecycleprovide
the reference-date measuring rod requiredto measure the inter-
national timing relation of country B to country A,on which
it depends in this particular line. In sucha situation one could
trace an international spread of business cycles,as far as timing is
concerned. Rubber growing in Malaya and the United Statesrubber
industry are a good illustration. Another examplewould be to take
the specific cycles of the Londonopen market discount rate as the
reference dates for the specific cycles ofother countries' open
market rates on the assumption that thesedepended on the former
as an expression of the leading role of the Londonmoney market.
But ui this case,as in the majority of others, no simple comple-
mentarity relationship of the stated kindprevails between these
countries. Therefore the findings of referencedate analysis become
much more difficult to interpret. Theseare also the most typical
cases, e.g., it cannot be denied that (before1914) the short-term
and long-term interestrates of France and Germany influencedeach otherand that both stood ina peculiar relationship to those in
London, which probably "dominated"them. But the questionsare:
precisely how did this relationshipmanifest itself? Was itii- tinuous? Was it stable underpressure? How do wemeasure
"pressure"? Did it undergo changesthat can be expressedas
functions of the general businesscycle in each particularcountry? All this should ofcourse be answered quantitatively.
Sumnarizing, we can say that thenotion of a world business cycle
may assume a more concretemeaning when one has delveddeeper into the study of the relatedphenomena. But that knowledge
must be built up from individualelements and the cyclecannot simply be postulated. Itwas also seen that the underlyingidea of a "world economy"is not very tangible anddoes not openup
That is, between these countries!There is of course also thedependency of short-term and long-termrates within each countiy. Aboutall this cf. Chapter IX, section 5.
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any particularlyattractive avenues for the study of the international
transmission of business cycleseither as a whole or along specific
lines.
Finally we shall raise the question, already alluded to, whether
the cyclical approach is such as to be recommended even when
no vague notionsof world business cycles are involved. In other
words one might form the notion ofworld disturbanceswithout
maintaining the complicated hypothesis of their cyclical character.
It is indeed easier to locate and identify isolated perturbations
of major character. They manifest themselves in a change of the
relationsof the activities of the various countries, which, though
difficult to describe, are more easily accessible than a world
business cycle.
As can be seen for national reference dates (cf. Table 1) certain
dates that we know to have been very great world crises do not
even occur there. Thisdoes not mean that the determination of
national turning points (especially upper turning points)isat
fault; it does mean that mostly during contractions phenomena
of crises occur which are far more spectacular thanthe turning
points and possibly even more important. Inthe minds of the
people October 1929 in the United States and the summerand fall
of 1931 in Europe weigh far more heavily and led tofar more
important businessdecisionsthan any upper turning point nearby
(in fact preceding these dates). These dates arealso, without
any question, of majorinternational significance. They can indeed
be discovered more easily than cycles with whichthey may, but
need not, be associated. It would therefore be quitesatisfactory if
such a list could be established, the individual crisesstudied and
taken as the basis for further generalizations.
Such a procedure might influence the techniquesand the kind
of material to be collected. Instead of long time series,their analysis
and correlations, particular historical instanceswould be studied.
This may seem to be an inferiormethod, but it need not be so.
The selection of special periods foralmost microscopic analysis
is a very useful procedure,particularly when the guidance of an
already established theory through the mazesof data is still lack-
ing. If such a critical period is oneof sharp and even violent move-
ment, it may contain andtherefore reveal, in accentuated form,
elements of crises that are prevalent inall.
For example, we probably know moretoday about financial crises,
connected with (if not evenproduced by) exchange precisely
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because these controls were applied to the very limit (e.g., death
penalty for violations) in the 1930's. This was not the first time
they had been used, but never before had they been pushed to
such extremes. Very likely our knowledge has gained much more
from the examination of this one occurrence than if there had been
a dozen minor ones. Now we also understand the earlier events
far better (those after World War I, South American policies before
that war, etc.). The same is notably true of inflations. The study
of the excessive iaflations of the period after 1918 has no doubt
greatly contributed toward our understanding of the much milder
inflationary processes that occur during most business expansions.
Studies in a similar vein recommend themselves in the field of
the international spread of economic fluctuations. There were the
great international crises of 1873, 1893, 1907, etc. and it is possible
to study them and the period preceding and following in the hope
that this may lead to the discovery of the mechanism at work.
The selection of particular, extreme cases for more minute in-
vestigation is nothing new in economics. Aside from the work of
Juglar and Jevonswho were concerned with entire cyclesfor
the most part individual crises that stood out fromamong the
minor and therefore less interesting fluctuations were investigated.
It was not until in 1913 Wesley C. Mitchell'sBusiness Cyclesap-
peared that the two approaches were merged.
At present it is impossible to make a definite choice. In this
work long time series are analyzed, butwe leave the way open
for a conspectus that does not primarily dependon cycles and
their turning points but assembles what informationcan be ob-
tained about crises that mayor may not coincide with turning
points,ss or may even have nothingto do with cycles.
In the course of the preparation of the present worka serious effort was
made in the direction of the study of individualcrises. The selection of the
two periods 1901-1908 and 1929-1931 recommended itself.World War I
separated them, yet they were truly international, hadessential financial fea-
hires, and material could be collected for both. Extensive chronologieswere
established for the four countries and special data,not available in the time
series used in the following chapters, were collected. Though thiswas a very
promising undertaking I returned to the long series because thedetail required
in the other approachshould it lead to more thana repetition of known facts
was too time consuming and without promise of reward whileone was lim- ited to only two crises. The greatest olstaclewas, however, the lack of a
real theory of transmission of fluctuations which wouldhave given the neces-
sary background. It is greatly to be hoped that individualanalyses of the
type discussed in the text above will be earned outpreferablytogether with
the writing of those additional business cycle histories thatare so sadly lacking.
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Section 7. Plan of the Foflotving Chapters
This book is essentially concerned withfinancial operations; thus
we shall have toinvestigate in the main short-term and long-term
financial transactions, interest rates, foreign investments,exchange
rates, gold and security movements,and stock markets. National
incomes and balances of paymentswould loom large in the picture
if useful data for long-termperiods were available; that is of
course not the case.
Our procedure will essentially be descriptive,but we shall con-
nect the descriptionwith as much analysis and interpretation as
is feasible. Instead of theoryilluminating the facts or leading to
new ones, thefacts will more often be found to be very uncom-
fortable for the theories. We do not aim at ageneral theoty of
the field covered nor would a theory suggestitself readily. How-
ever we hope thatthe reader will accept the general, fundamental
attitude even if he should regret to see thefacts not as complete
as he wished,the statistical techniques and methods not as power-
ful as they should be, and the theoriessomewhat damaged without
adequate replacement.
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